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I. Introduction 
This paper reports on the behavior of markets in which all agents have identical costs with econo- 
mies of scale over the entire range of demand. Each firm, by choosing a larger scale of plant 
and a larger volume, can experience lower average cost. Thus, the markets are characterized by 
the fundamental technological property that has motivated decades of theorizing about natural 
monopoly and imperfect competition. The primary question posed by the research is whether or 
not a natural monopoly emerges and sets prices at monopoly levels, or whether the data are more 
closely approximated by some alternative model of imperfect competition, such as monopolistic 
competition, Cournot oligopoly, or contestable market theory. 
Some of the principle results of the experiments reported here can, in retrospect, be inter- 
preted as having been anticipated by the pathbreaking work of Coursey, Isaac, Luke and Smith 
[1, 69-84], and by Coursey, Isaac, and Smith [2, 91-113]. While these previous experiments 
involved economic environments that were much less complicated than the one studied here, the 
tendencies previously observed are clearly present in the behaviors reported here. So, in a sense, 
the results reported here can be interpreted as a major extension of the previous results, as well 
as replication and robustness check. 
The similarities of experimental design with previous experiments rest on the facts of falling 
average cost and no barriers to entry that existed in all experiments. However, the number and 
*This paper began with a project in an experimental economics class at Caltech in which G. Elbaz and A. Sugiyama 
were undergraduate students. In addition to the authors, Peter Ying contributed to the project during the initial stages 
of research. The comments of William Novshek are also appreciated. The financial support of the National Science 
Foundation and the Caltech Laboratory for Experimental Economics and Political Science is gratefully acknowledged. 
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nature of departures from the previous research are substantial. The markets studied here were 
much larger, so parameters took values in a more continuous manner. The experiments studied 
here involved two markets, so entry into the falling average cost market was accompanied by 
the opportunity cost of profits foregone in the alternative market. The alternative market was a 
computerized double auction which agents generally enjoy, so entry into the falling average cost 
market did not result from an attempt to relieve boredom, which one might have suspected played 
a role in previous studies. Agents entering the falling average cost market were required to make a 
choice of scale of plant that affected costs. Thus, the theory of cost minimization played an active 
role in developing models. This dimension was completely absent from previous experiments. 
Previous experiments used linear average costs that fell with volume until a capacity constraint 
was reached (within the range of demand) and then costs became vertical. Average costs in the 
experiments reported here were nonlinear and fell throughout the range of demand. In addition, 
the nonlinearities, scale economies, and demand were configured to create Cournot equilibria in 
the appropriate Cournot model of the environment. The Cournot equilibria were separated from 
the competitive (price equals average cost plus opportunity cost) equilibrium. In previous experi- 
ments the Cournot equilibrium was also the competitive equilibrium. The number of potential 
entrants used in previous experiments was small, ranging from two to four. In the experiments 
reported here, there were seven potential competitors. Briefly put, the choice of parameters for 
the experiments reported here was such that the economic environment was similar to those 
commonly found in the figures in economics textbooks. 
II. Experimental Environment, Design and Procedures 
A total of three experiments were conducted. Subjects were students at the California Institute 
of Technology and summer interns at Caltech. Some of the subjects were experienced in the 
operation of electronic markets. As it turns out, the empirical tendencies that were observed in 
the experiments are so pronounced that only three experiments appear to be needed to answer 
the original question posed. Since the experiments are expensive in terms of time and money, a 
decision was made to limit the number of experiments to three. Given the behavior exhibited by 
the twenty-one people studied, the expectation that anything would be learned from additional 
replications seems too low to justify the cost. 
Each experiment consisted of 7 buyers and 7 sellers. Subjects with experience were placed 
in the more complex role of sellers. Two markets were created. They will be called market A 
and market B. The buyers could participate in both. Sellers could participate in either but not in 
both. In market A sellers had identical cost functions designed such that they were guaranteed 
a rent from participating in the market. The parameters were chosen such that in market A the 
rents per seller and the market price were (theoretically) independent of the number of sellers that 
chose to sell in that market. Market A was organized by a (computerized) double auction that 
fully occupied the attention of the sellers that chose to function in that market so they would not 
be motivated by boredom to enter market B. 
Market B was different. Sellers that chose to operate in market B made irrevocable deci- 
sions about scale of plant, the quantity that they would offer for sale and the price they would 
post. Thus, the market organization was the standard posted price environment in which com- 
mitments were private information until the market opened. The only difference was that a seller 
could choose to drop out of the market once the decisions of other sellers were public but before 
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the market opened. The decisions to drop out were also private (revealed simultaneously) and 
irrevocable. The dropout decision served to limit losses to the opportunity cost of market A profits 
foregone, and reduced the probability that subject bankruptcies would disrupt the experiment. In 
market B all sellers had the same cost function. The cost function was characterized by economies 
of scale. 
In summary, the economic environment had the following properties: 
1. Participation in market B involved an opportunity cost because reasonably predictable 
rents could be gained from participation in market A. 
2. Participation in market A was "fun" in the sense that many people enjoy the speed and 
activity of the computerized double auction. 
3. Participation in market B could be done without exposure to a major out-of-pocket loss. 
Sellers could "drop out" if they expected volume to be less than was anticipated at the 
time that scale of plant was chosen. 
4. All transactions took place in a currency called francs. Each franc was converted to 
dollars at a rate of .0075 for buyers and .006 for sellers. 
The Market Environment 
A continuous approximation of market demands for markets A and B are contained in Figure 1. 
The equation for the continuous approximation of the market demand in market B is 
P = 1110- 25x. (1) 
Individual parameters for the demanders are in Table I. Each of seven demanders made 
money by participating in market A and in market B. Each buyer had the same redemption values 
1200 
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Table I. Individual Incentives 
Market A Market B 
Unit Demand* Costs** Market Demand*** 
1 1000 550 1085 
2 1000 550 1060 
3 1000 700 1035 
4 400 700 1010 
5 400 700 985 
6 400 700 960 
7 400 700 935 
8 400 700 910 
9 400 700 etc. 
10 400 700 -25 each unit 
11 400 700 
12 400 700 
13 400 700 
14 400 700 
15 400 700 
16 
17 
18 
19 
*All buyer agents (00 through 06) had the same demand as listed here. 
**All seller agents (07 through 13) had the same costs as listed here. 
***Individual agents demand rotated each period 
in market A each period. That is, in market A both the market demand and the individual re- 
demption values were constant over periods. In market B, the market demand was constant over 
periods but the redemption value of each individual changed from period to period. A fixed family 
of schedules was rotated among the individual demanders. The rotation schedule is contained 
in Plott, Sugiyama, and Elbaz [8]. The rotation convention was used because uncertainty about 
which model might be most accurate gave us little confidence in our ability to predict incomes of 
buyers. We wanted the income of all subject buyers to be sufficiently high to keep their interests. 
The rotation had a useful feature of removing dramatic asymmetries. Each of seven sellers had 
identical costs throughout the experiment. The fact that the costs were identical was not known 
by any agent in the markets. Each had the option of participating in either market A or in market 
B, but not in both. A seller that participated in market A used the cost schedule in Table I. For a 
single seller the graph of the (marginal) costs are included in Figure 1. As can be seen, the seller 
had two low cost units and then had constant cost afterwards for enough units to satisfy the entire 
demand. 
Given these individual costs in market A, the market price (according to the competitive 
model) will be constant at 700 at all volumes near the demand (at 21 units) regardless of the 
number of suppliers in market A. As will be stated more clearly below, the equilibrium price will 
be near 700 and rents for all sellers in market A will be about 300 (2 units at 150 = 700 - 550 
each) regardless of the number of other sellers in market A, as long as there are at least two.' 
The costs of all seven suppliers were the same for market B. Each subject had separate tables 
1. Typically, two or three sellers are enough for competitive equilibrium behavior in a double auction market. 
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(in different colors) for marginal cost, average cost, and total cost. The total cost table is shown 
as Table II. As can be seen, costs depended upon both scale of plant and volume of sales. 
A continuous approximation to the underlying discrete parameter cost function has been 
useful in the development of behavioral predictions, as well as experimental design decisions. 
Figure 2 contains a graph of the long-run average cost curve in this continuous model, and also 
the short-run average costs for selected scales of plant. A continuous approximation of the market 
demand curve is imposed over the average cost for comparison. 
The formula for the competitive model is as follows. The model is restricted to the values 
of parameters in the range of the tables of costs. The model begins with short-run average cost 
(SRAC) which depends upon output and the scale of plant (x, s). In the discrete values of costs 
in the table the scale of plant is indicated by letters of the alphabet, starting with the letter A. In 
the continuous model, if scale is A then s = 11; if scale is B then s = 12, etc., with a change of 
one in s as the letters change: 
SRAC(x,s) = 3/4(x - s)2 + 1/4(s - 40)2 + 300. (2) 
The optimum scale of plant given a quantity x is indicated by s*(x). The formula is 
s*x) = 10 + 3/4x. (3) 
Substituting (3) into (2), the long-run average cost function, LRAC (x) is obtained. 
LRAC(x) = SRAC(x,s*(x)) = 600- 15x + 3/16x2. (4) 
Of course this yields the long-run total cost (LRTC) and the long-run marginal cost (LRMC) 
as follows: 
LRTC(x) = 600x - 15x2 + 3/16x3 (5) 
LRMC(x) = dLRTC(x)/dx = 600 - 30x + 9/16x2. (6) 
The continuous model will be very useful to the interested reader. The complicated calcula- 
tions for the equilibria of various models were first done in the context of the continuous model. 
The location of the equilibria in models based on discrete parameters was always nearby. 
Market Organization 
Market A was a computerized double auction. Market B was a posted price market. Both markets 
opened at the same time for trading. Sellers were informed about the market demand function in 
market B but they knew nothing about the market demand function in market A. Since market A 
followed standard procedures for MUDA markets,2 only the timing and the details of market B 
need to be reviewed. 
Before each period all seller agents were required to decide which market they would enter. 
After deciding they (privately) drew a large X through the record sheet of the market not chosen. 
Agents choosing market B would then fill in the blanks on their record for the period committing 
2. See Plott and Gray [6, 245-58] for a detailed description of this market, or see Plott [5] for a description of the 
computerized version. 
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Table II. Cumulative or Total Costs 
Production Schedule Choice .-......> 
A a C D E F G H I J K L M N 0 p Q R S T U V W X Y 
565 587 590 596 603 613 624 638 653 671 690 712 735 761 788 818 849 883 918 956 995 1037 1080 1126 1173 
1142 1142 1146 1154 1166 1182 1202 1226 1254 1286 1322 1362 1406 1454 1506 1562 1622 1686 1754 1826 1902 1982 2066 2154 2246 
1675 1670 1672 1679 1693 1712 1738 1769 1807 1850 1900 1955 2017 2084 2158 2237 2323 2414 2512 2615 2725 2840 2962 3089 3223 
2188 2176 2172 2176 2188 2208 2236 2272 2316 2368 2428 2496 2572 2656 2748 2848 2956 3072 3196 3328 3468 3616 3772 3936 4108 
2686 2664 2651 2649 2656 2674 2701 2739 2786 2844 2911 2989 3076 3174 3281 3399 3526 3664 3811 3969 4136 4314 4501 4699 4906 
3174 3138 3114 3102 3102 3114 3138 3174 3222 3282 3354 3438 3534 3642 3762 3894 4038 4194 4362 4542 4734 4938 5154 5382 5622 
3656 3603 3565 3540 3530 3533 3551 3582 3628 3687 3761 3848 3950 4065 4195 4338 4496 4667 4853 5052 5266 5493 5735 5990 6260 
4136 4064 4008 3968 3944 3936 3944 3968 4008 4064 4136 4224 4328 4448 4584 4736 4904 5088 5288 5504 5736 5984 6248 6528 6824 
4619 4525 4448 4390 4349 4327 4322 4336 4367 4417 4484 4570 4673 4795 4934 5092 5267 5461 5672 5902 6149 6415 6698 7000 7319 
5110 4990 4890 4810 4750 4710 4690 4690 4710 4750 4810 4890 4990 5110 5250 5410 5590 5790 6010 6250 6510 6790 7090 7410 7750 
5613 5464 5338 5233 5151 5090 5052 5035 5041 5068 5118 5189 5283 5398 5536 5695 5877 6080 6306 6553 6823 7114 7428 7763 8121 
6132 5952 5796 5664 5556 5472 5412 5376 5364 5376 5412 5472 5556 5664 5796 5952 6132 6336 6564 6816 7092 7392 7716 8064 8436 
6672 6458 6269 6107 5970 5860 5775 5717 5684 5678 5697 5743 5814 5912 6035 6185 6360 6562 6789 7043 7322 7628 7959 8317 8700 
7238 6986 6762 6566 6398 6258 6146 6062 6006 5978 5978 6006 6062 6146 6258 6398 6566 6762 6986 7238 7518 7826 8162 8526 8918 
7834 7541 7279 7046 6844 6671 6529 6416 6334 6281 6259 6266 6304 6371 6469 6596 6754 6941 7159 7406 7684 7991 8329 8696 9094 
8464 8128 7824 7552 7312 7104 6928 6784 6672 6592 6544 6528 6544 6592 6672 6784 6928 7104 7312 7552 7824 8128 8464 8832 9232 
Q133 M71 Afl0 6nflA 7807 7561 7348 7170 7025 6915 6838 6706 6787 6813 6872 6966 7093 7255 7450 7680 7943 8241 
9846 9414 9018 8658 8334 8046 7794 7576 7398 7254 7146 7074 7038 7038 7074 7146 7254 7398 7578 7794 8046 8334 
10607 10122 9676 9267 8897 8564 8270 8013 7795 7614 7472 7367 7301 7272 7282 7329 7415 7538 7700 7899 8137 8412 
11420 10580 10380 9920 9500 9120 88 848 U 60 0 0000u 75IU 7U 5o10 I752U 7500 i52u fIaou 1ooU Iou Uuuu oZZU 8480 
8572 
8658 
8726 
8780 
9329 8983 8678 8416 8195 8017 7880 7786 7733 7723 7754 7828 7943 8101 8300 
8602 8382 
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Figure 2. Long-Run Average Cost, Selected Short-Run Costs and Market Demand 
themselves to a scale of plant, a quantity to be offered, and a price. The computerized MUDA 
program allows the simultaneous operation of multiple markets. Each of the seven sellers was as- 
signed to a "personal market" in which no other seller could participate. The sellers would enter 
their (price, quantity) pairs in an order box fixed on their individual markets. At the appropriate 
(public) signal each seller would press the enter key, thereby making their private decisions public 
to all buyers and sellers as they were displayed by the computer as asks (to sell) in their individual 
markets. Once sellers had seen the asks of other sellers, they had the opportunity to cancel their 
own asks. This was done simultaneously on signal. Sellers canceling asks were not permitted to 
enter the A market. They did nothing for the remainder of the period. Thus, sellers who entered 
market B and canceled experienced the opportunity cost of A profits. 
After sellers who had made the decision to enter market B had the opportunity to cancel, all 
markets opened for trading. Market A proceeded along the standard lines for the computerized 
MUDA. In market B, sellers who remained each had a price posted and a maximum quantity. At 
any time during a period buyers could toggle to any of these markets and purchase the number of 
units desired at the posted price, up to the amount for sale that the seller had left. Buyers could 
only accept the asks in these markets. That is, they could not tender bids in any market except 
market A. 
A comment about the organization is in order. Market A was a double auction and it existed 
as a source of income and entertainment for those who chose not to enter market B. Market B 
was a posted price market because it is thought to provide the best circumstances for monopoly 
behavior [10, 83-106]. When the demand function is known, and prices are posted, the seller is 
most likely to successfully charge monopoly prices. Double auctions are known to have strong 
tendencies to converge to a competitive equilibrium even in the presence of monopoly. If market 
B had been a double auction, then any tendency to converge to a competitive equilibrium could 
have been attributed to the market microstructure alone, as opposed to the industrial organiza- 
tion. Thus, the posted price institution was thought to be a more favorable environment for the 
emergence of monopoly pricing than the double auction. 
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The cancellation property is important as a risk reduction feature in this type of market. If a 
seller chooses a large scale of plant and succeeds in selling only a few units, large losses can be 
experienced. Buyers have the capacity to punish high-priced sellers by purchasing only a unit or 
two. Similarly, well-meaning buyers who want to share the volume by spreading purchases over 
sellers can be very costly to a seller who does not otherwise get the volume. Likewise, accidental 
purchases can be very costly. Cancellation allows those sellers who choose relatively high prices 
the opportunity to avoid such risks. 
The experiment contained one other special feature. A market demand function for market 
B was privately distributed to the sellers on a sheet of paper. All sellers knew what it meant. The 
demand function given sellers was actually 10 francs below the actual induced values. Buyers 
typically do not trade without a small profit margin for themselves. We believed that the function 
we gave them was a better model of what they would experience than would be the actual limit 
values. 
Procedures 
The experiments were conducted in the Laboratory for Experimental Economics and Political 
Science at Caltech. Subjects consisted of undergraduates, graduate students at the California Insti- 
tute of Technology, plus high school students who were attending a special summer program. 
Most had previous experience in some type of computerized market. All had paged through a 
computerized instruction routine that familiarized them with key functions and the mechanics of 
making bids, offers, and acceptances. 
In addition to the three experiments reported here, pilot experiments were conducted. The 
pilot experiments were discarded because they typically involved choices of parameters that were 
based on a miscalculation of the theoretical models. The parameters and procedures of one ex- 
periment were exactly like those reported in this paper but the data are not reported because 
one subject evidenced substantial confusion. The results of these unreported experiments ap- 
peared qualitatively similar to the experiments that are reported here. Space constraints effectively 
preclude their publication. Should anyone want to study them in detail, the data will be made 
available upon request. 
Experimental sessions which lasted on the order of three hours began in the evening at 
about 7:00 P.M. The detailed instructions that were read to the subjects are contained in Plott, 
Sugiyama, and Elbaz [8]. In addition, the material presented on the chalkboard and the step-by- 
step procedures for conducting the experiment are also included. 
The highlights of these experimental procedures are as follows. Subjects were paid a "show 
up" fee of $5.00 if they were extras and were turned away from participation. Subjects agreed 
to work off any losses incurred during the experiment at a rate of $10.00 per hour. Of course, 
buyers could make no losses unless they resulted from some sort of (foolish) speculation or from 
a typo. Contracts involving obvious typos that would result in large losses were always voided by 
the experimenter (a standard practice). However, sellers could make a loss. If a seller entered the 
B market at a substantial scale of plant and sold only a small number of units the losses could be 
considerable. 
Sellers who wanted a sure return could participate in the A market. The design of this market 
was such that a rent of $1.80 per period was almost certain for participation in market A and the 
seller was exposed to no possibility of a loss. On average, each participant made approximately 
$30 from the experiments. 
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Each seller was provided cost schedules for market A sales.3 For market B each seller had 
color-coded tables that gave marginal cost (pink), average cost (green), and total cost (yellow), 
of combinations of volume and scale of plant on 11 by 14 sheets of paper. Scale of plant could 
take 24 values, labeled A through Y. 
Two practice periods were conducted. The parameters were the same as those that were used 
in the experiment. The mechanics of the experiment were very complex and many questions were 
prompted during these sessions. The answers to all questions were given publicly in a form that 
yielded no information about parameters that was not already public. After each period, for the 
first five periods (including the two practice periods), the accounting of each subject was checked 
and spot checks were made throughout the experiment. 
III. Models 
Ten different types of models can be applied to the economic environment. Of course these models 
share many basic principles but they also differ in many ways. Some give sharp predictions and 
the others remain vague. Where possible the models will be applied directly to the environment 
in a technical, mathematical fashion. Speculations and theorizing about which model might be 
expected to fit the data best are not considered to be part of the exercise at this stage of the ex- 
perimental inquiry. Table III contains a summary of the predictions for those models for which 
predictions can be computed. The paragraphs below will briefly describe each model listed in 
the table. 
A note on efficiency may be useful, especially for those who are not familiar with experi- 
mental economics. The measure invented by Plott and Smith [7, 133-53] is a direct adaptation 
of consumers' and producers' surpluses. The buyers receive franc redemption values from the 
experimenter that can be modeled as a (derived) demand function. The total value of francs re- 
deemed by buyers is like the gross benefits to buyers from the units they acquired. Sellers pay 
francs to the experimenter for units sold. These payments are costs. The allocation that maximizes 
gross benefits minus costs is the most efficient. It is the one that maximizes franc earnings of sub- 
jects (exhausts all possible gains from exchange). Actual franc earnings divided by the maximum 
possible is the efficiency with which the system is operating. 
Under ordinary modes of organization, 100 percent efficiency of operation is thought to be 
unattainable in the downward sloping average cost case. If a single price is charged, and if price 
is equated to marginal cost, then sellers would lose money. This degree of inefficiency is thought 
to be structural in the falling-average cost case. 
Other practical sources of inefficiency exist. Tough bargaining sometimes results in failures 
to trade. Suppliers might choose the "wrong" scale of plant and thereby impose more costs on 
the system than necessary. Suppliers might choose to enter the B market and then cancel. The 
efficiency loss would be due to the opportunity cost of the low cost units that such suppliers could 
have delivered to the A market. Suppliers might choose an unnecessarily limiting quantity of x 
offer to the market B. In the section on models the efficiency of the equilibria allocation predicted 
3. Rounding errors caused slight discrepancies between these schedules. For example, total cost at the contested 
market equilibria of scale W and volume 31 was 9765, if computed from the average cost table, and it was 9773 as listed 
on the total cost schedule, a difference of 4.8 cents. 
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Table III. Models and Predictions 
Market B Market A 
Per 
Number Per Agent Number 
of Scale Market Market Agent Profit of Market Market System 
Model Agents Choice Price Volume Volume (Francs) Agents Price Volume Efficiency 
1. Natural monopoly I M 684 17 17 4841 6 700 21 .80 
2. Tacit collusion - - - - - - - - - 
3. Cournot (sym) duopoly 2 G,H 609 20 10 1400 5 700 21 .76 
4. Cournot (asym) triopoly* 3 600 20 4 700 21 .70 
(1) D,E 6 498 
(2) E 7 670 
Monopolistic Competition 
(Sym. Cournot) 
5. Quadopoly* 4 C,D 600 20 5 351 3 700 21 .67 
6. Quintopoly* 5 C 600 20 4 228 2 700 21 .64 
7. Perfectly contested (competitive) I W 325 31 31 302 6 700 21 1.00 
8. Over-contested 5 W 325 31 (31,0) (302,0) 2 700 21 .94 
9. Unstable ("Bertrand") 
10. Market collapse 0 - - 0 0 - 7 700 21 .41 
*For ease of computation a transaction cost was imposed as a parameter in price determination. 
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Figure 3. Monopolist in Market B: A Continuous Approximation 
by each model is listed. The logic of each of these models justifies the nature and potential reasons 
for inefficiencies. 
Natural Monopoly (Classical) 
The classic model is natural monopoly. According to this model, because of the existence of 
economies of scale, competition will lead to the existence of a monopoly. All other sellers will 
participate in market A. This monopoly facing the market demand curve will choose the profit 
maximizing value of variables without regard to the effect that this action might have on the ac- 
tions of other sellers, such as their proclivity to enter market B. That is, where P = D(x) is the 
market demand function and long-run costs are C(x,s(x)) the monopolist sets the value of the 
variables to 
maximize[D (x)x - C(x, s (x))]. 
x 
For the parameters of the experiment the solution is a price of 684, a quantity equal to 17, a scale 
of plant of size M and a profit of 4841 in francs. These can be read from the table. Figure 3 
demonstrates the model. For convenience the continuous model, which is only an approximation 
of the underlying parameters, is used in the figure. The accurate predictions based on the discrete 
environment are in Table IV. 
Tacit Collusion 
Collusion models are very numerous depending upon the complexity of the agreement that can be 
enforced. It is assumed here that collusion would lead to choices of variables that are good from 
the seller's point of view. We presume that the values would be something between Cournot and 
monopoly and that the volume would be similarly restricted. 
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Table IV. Experimental Results: Average Transaction Prices, Number of Entrants, Volumes, Efficiencies 
061191 062791 071891 
A B A B A B 
Period P Vol. P Vol. N Eff. P Vol. P Vol. N Eff. P Vol. P Vol. N Eff. 
1 717 22 325 30 5 92% 584 25 412 26 3 83% 697 21 403 29 4 78% 
2 691 21 312 31 3 92% 727 20 437 26 5 88% 704 21 351 30 5 85% 
3 696 19 325 30 2 92% 696 21 402 30 2 89% 682 21 350 30 2 98% 
4 685 21 324 31 2 97% 709 21 387 31 4 94% 693 21 340 28 3 93% 
5 691 21 322 31 3 97% 702 21 355 30 2 96% 701 21 324 31 3 97% 
6 703 21 315 31 4 95% 701 23 339 32 2 95% 703 21 319 31 2 98% 
7 696 21 323 31 2 99% 702 21 330 31 4 95% 696 21 319 31 2 99% 
8 700 21 320 31 2 99% 699 23 324 33 2 95% 697 21 318 31 3 97% 
9 698 21 321 31 1 100% 696 22 0 0 40% 694 20 330 31 1 98% 
10 701 19 400 28 2 93% 698 21 330 30 3 96% 696 23 325 31 2 96% 
11 691 21 350 30 3 72% 700 21 326 31 3 97% 696 21 320 31 3 97% 
12 698 21 345 28 3 90% 701 21 324 33 4 95% 696 21 321 31 1 100% 
13 698 21 330 31 3 97% 700 21 335 30 2 98% 639 21 319 27 2 85% 
14 700 21 335 31 2 99% 699 22 325 31 3 95% 696 21 330 31 1 98% 
15 702 24 - 0 3 32% 700 22 330 31 3 95% 697 21 328 31 3 97% 
16 700 21 328 32 2 92% 700 21 326 31 3 97% 695 21 324 33 3 97% 
17 700 21 327 31 2 99% 700 21 327 31 2 99% 700 21 403 19 3 71% 
18 700 22 326 31 2 97% 700 21 325 31 2 97% 697 23 0 3 34% 
19 701 21 323 31 2 94% 691 19 437 26 1 93% 697 21 321 31 2 99% 
AV. 698 21 331 29 2.5 91% 695 21 356 29 2.6 91% 694 21 336 28 2.4 90% 
Cournot Models 
Cournot models are all derived from the same general principles. Each competitor evaluates the 
market as if the quantity offered by the other sellers is a constant and the resulting market price 
is that determined by the sum of the quantities offered by sellers. For insights about the structure 
of these models, especially in the presence of non convexities as in the case with economies of 
scale, see Novshek [3, 61-70; 4]. 
Application of the class of models to any real market, especially the ones created for these 
experiments, might be met with three a priori criticisms/qualifications. First, the Cournot solu- 
tions to the technical problems are generally not unique. Typically, both symmetric solutions in 
which all firms act identically and asymmetric solutions, in which some firms are larger than 
others, exist. The symmetric solutions and those asymmetric solutions that have been identified 
and seem plausible have been included in Table III. The second qualification is that the principles 
that might govern entry into a market are not systematically integrated (unless lack of entry is 
treated as part of an asymmetric solution) into the analysis. For this reason, a special treatment 
of Cournot models, under a heading called monopolistic competition, is included. The third criti- 
cism is derived from the nature of the market structure itself. Agents in these markets post a price 
and a quantity. There is every reason to assume that the seller with the lowest price will sell all 
units that the seller offers, up to the demand function limits. The hypothesis that the quantity 
sold by other sellers remains constant, will almost certainly be violated. Thus, the structure of 
the decision problem might appear to resemble that of the Bertrand theory, more than Cournot, 
depending upon how the posted quantity is treated in the analysis. 
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Figure 4. Quadopolist in Market B: A Continuous Approximation 
All of the criticisms/qualifications are derived in part from the fact that the Courot model 
is incomplete as a theory. It is silent about the nature of the price determination process. If sellers 
(or buyers) are supposed to be involved in price determination, then some sort of explicit coordi- 
nation device must exist that guides sellers to settle on the same price, and guides buyers so that 
sellers share market volume in a Cournot fashion. Instead of dealing with all of this complexity, 
the Cournot model relies only on axioms typical of game theoretic representations of markets that 
assert that only one price exists, and further asserts that the one price is determined by the law of 
supply and demand once sellers' quantity choices are given. Nevertheless, Courot models have 
broad experimental support and must be taken seriously in any environment until the data suggest 
otherwise. 
The Courot solutions for duopoly and for triopoly are also in Table III. Notice that the price 
predicted is 609 and then becomes 600, regardless of the number of firms. Of course, firm size 
must decrease as the number of firms increases. This means that the scale of plant chosen by 
firms must be smaller under triopoly than under duopoly. 
Monopolistic Competition 
The classical model of monopolistic competition is interpreted as a four firm Cournot market. 
Scale of plants are small in the equilibrium and the opportunity cost of 300 francs ($1.80) is 
barely covered by the 351 profit. Entry of another firm would force the profits to levels below the 
opportunity costs. In the table the Courot equilibrium profits for quintopoly, a fifth firm, are less 
than the 300 francs opportunity cost for entering the B market. Again, notice from the table that 
the price predictions are the same, regardless of the number of firms. 
In Figure 4 is shown a representative firm in the four firm equilibrium. The background 
shows the market demand function. The costs graphs are from the continuous approximation of 
costs given by equation (4). 
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Contested Markets 
The contestable market literature has motivated researchers to look for two different types of 
phenomena in experimental data. The possible phenomenon are called "models" here, but they 
operate more like statements that characterize the extremes of what one might expect in data. 
Of course, those extremes and the relative tendencies toward them contain potentially useful 
information. 
Perfectly Contested Market (Competitive) Equilibrium. This is the case in which only one 
seller exists in the market. The seller produces at a price and output that leaves price equal to 
average cost, including opportunity cost. The profits in market A and market B would be the 
same (thereby justifying the use of the term "competitive"). As indicated in the table, the price 
of the single entrant would be 325; volume would be 31; scale of plant would be W, and the other 
six sellers would be in market A. The relationships are in Figure 3. 
Without side payments, such as a subsidy to compensate a firm for losses, and a completely 
different institutional arrangement, such as marginal cost pricing, or the incentive compatible 
equivalent, average cost pricing might be the best that can be expected from a consumer's point 
of view. It is used as a measure for 100 percent efficiency. 
Over-Contested Market Equilibrium. This model postulates that the price and quantities sold 
would be the same as the perfectly contested outcome above. The only difference is the number 
of firms that have decided to enter. Previous experiments have defined this model to predict that 
all of the potential firms enter. Obviously, the plausibility of such phenomena would a priori seem 
low but this model is included as a benchmarker for completeness. The number, 5, is taken to be 
the maximum that could leave market A and still have it behave competitively. 
Unstable ("Bertrand") 
We do not know the equilibrium of the Bertrand model of these experimental markets. Presumably 
it involves some sort of mixed strategy. In the data this would appear as a type of variability in 
prices. At this point the model is included for completeness and to draw attention to the possibility 
that the data might not exhibit any type of monotone convergence property. It is also included 
to draw attention to the fact that the literature contains suggestions about how such variability 
phenomena might be modeled should it be observed. 
Market Collapse (Type 1) 
Entry into the contested market will involve a cost. The possibility of out-of-pocket losses also 
exists. Since there are no mechanisms for coordinating entry, sellers might all decide to operate 
only in the A market. Under such a circumstance the supply in B would be zero. The market 
would have collapsed. Type 1 collapse is the case when no firm enters the B market. 
Market Collapse (Type 2) 
The second type of collapse can occur when more than one firm decides to enter but all cancel 
leaving no one to supply the market. This is a type of coordination failure which can occur 
because the decisions to cancel market B offers are made simultaneously. 
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IV. Results 
The central results are easy to state. The contestable markets model is the most accurate of those 
considered. After a brief review of the data, the discussion turns to making clear the strength of 
this central proposition. Following the main results, the remainder of this section is devoted to a 
discussion of a series of five observations about both individual and systems behavior. 
A typical price time series for both markets are shown in Figures 5 and 6. Figure 5 con- 
tains the time series for market A, and Figure 6 contains the time series for market B. Vertical 
lines separate periods. The measure of time differs in the two figures. In market A the measure 
is seconds. In market B the measure is the number of events (e.g., asks, contracts) because the 
high speed with which events occur in clock time make them indistinguishable, given the units 
(seconds) in which clocktime is measured. 
The horizontal lines in the figures show the price predictors for various models. The top line 
is the monopoly price. The second line is the price predicted by all Cournot and monopolistic 
competition models. The bottom line is the "competitive" price predicted by the contestable- 
market model. Contracts are indicated by circles in both the A market and the B market; and 
in market B the prices posted by sellers are displayed by small triangles. Cancellations in the B 
markets are not shown, but in most cases all sellers in the B market canceled, except the seller 
with the lowest posted price. 
Figure 7 contains the price and volume data pooled across all experiments. Each dot repre- 
sents a period in one of the three experiments. The market demand function and the predictions 
of selected models are also shown in the figure. 
The visual impressions are that prices converged to the competitive equilibrium in market 
A and that prices converged to the one predicted by the contestable-market model in market 
B. These visual impressions are essentially correct. The first results reported in this section make 
the nature of the data that support these impressions precise. 
The first result is a traditional statement intended to prevent any misconceptions about what 
is being reported. Sometimes experimental data are predicted by models in an accurate statistical 
sense. However, in most cases none of the models are statistically accurate. The first result makes 
clear that these models contain unanticipated and unexplained errors and, thereby, sets the stage 
for all subsequent analysis. 
RESULT 1. All models can be rejected as a statistically accurate representation of the data. 
Support. All models are static equilibrium models. However, the data for the B markets, such 
as the one contained in Figure 6, exhibits an obvious type of convergence pattern which is not 
captured by any of the models, even if a random error term is added. In the absence of additional 
theory appended to the models to take care of the dynamics, the models are rejected. I 
The second result is perhaps the central result of the paper. It states that the contestable 
market theory is the one best supported by the data. 
RESULT 2. After thefirst six periods, all relevant economic variables (prices, volumes, profits, 
scale of plant choices, and efficiencies) are closer to the predictions of the two contestable market 
models than to the predictions of any other model. 
Support. Each of the variables will be discussed in order. All models predict competitive 
behavior in the A markets. The competitive price is 700 and the volume is 21. In 51 of the 57 
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Figure 7. Period Prices and Quantities, All Periods, All Experiments 
periods of all experiments the average price of the period was within 10 francs (6 cents for sellers 
and .75 of a cent for buyers) of the competitive equilibrium. In 56 of these periods the volume 
was within 3 units of the 21 predicted and in 41 periods the volume was exactly 21 units. The 
relevant data are in Table IV. Since the price and volume in the A markets behaved substantially 
as predicted by all models, the relevant comparisons are all in the B markets. 
In the B markets prices and volumes tended to be closer to the contestable market models 
than any of the others. In 41 of the 57 periods, prices were within 10 francs of the price predicted 
by the contestable-market models (325). In no period was the price within 10 francs of the price 
predicted by the natural monopoly model (684), and in no period was the price within 10 francs 
of the price predicted by any Coumot model (609). The count comes directly from the data in 
Table IV and the predictions in Table III. Similarly, the volume was within three units of the 
contestable market prediction (31) in 49 of the 57 periods. It was never that close to the prediction 
of the natural monopoly model (17), and it was never within three units of the predictions of the 
Courot models (20). Price and market volume figures support the contestable-market model over 
the others. 
Volume of individual firms further support the contestability model over the Courot models 
and the monopolistic competition models which, because of symmetry assumptions, predict that 
all B market entrants will have the same volume. In 53 of the 57 periods no more than one firm 
had positive sales in the B market. Thus, in 53 of 57 periods the data support contestability over 
monopolistic competition. In none of these three periods in which more than one firm made B 
market sales, was the distribution volumes near equality as predicted by the symmetric game 
models. As will be implicit in the discussions below, sellers that chose to enter the B market did 
not limit their quantities as required by the Coumot model and as they could have done under the 
procedures. 
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In market B profit levels predicted by competing models are in Table III. Profits should be 
at, or above 300, which is the (nearly) certain profit that can be obtained for participation in 
market A. Actual profits are in Table V,A. The listing of actual profits of sellers in market B 
are in Table V,B. The "active" firms referenced in the table are those that did not cancel their 
posted offer after they had seen the offers of other sellers. Shown also is the number of sellers 
that entered the B market at the beginning of the period. 
Consider only the last four periods of the experiments after some level of equilibration has 
been achieved. The average profit of the firms that sell units over all three experiments is 451.6 
francs per period. The average profit of all entrants is 184.0 francs per period. Thus, the average 
profit of sellers who entered market B is closer to the 302 predicted by the perfectly contested 
model than to the prediction of any other model, except quintopoly, which can be rejected since 
the number of sellers was always less than five. Consideration of more periods does not change 
this conclusion. In fact, the conclusion is only reinforced. The average profit earned per period 
by all entrants in market B, considering period 3 and later, for the three experiments was 29.4 
francs, 279.0 francs, and 74.2 francs, respectively, far below that predicted by any model except 
quintopoly. 
The frequency of scale of plant choices is contained in Table VI. Only three choices are at 
scale levels (D, E, G, and M) predicted by any of the alternative models to the contested market 
model. The contested market model predicts scale W, which is the mode of choices of sellers (41 
choices out of 146 total). Over 40 percent of all choices are within one level of that predicted by 
the contestable-market model. The small mode at scale K is interesting because scale K was the 
example used in the instructions to illustrate the nature of costs. 
Efficiency levels are reported in Table IV. The average efficiency level for the three experi- 
ments is .91, .91, and .90, which is much closer to the .94 predicted by the over-contested market 
model than it is the efficiency predicted by natural monopoly (80%), duopoly (76%), triopoly 
(70%), monopolistic competition (67%), or market collapse (41%). On average, the perfectly 
contested model is a better predictor of efficiency than any of the noncontested models. 
In all dimensions the two contestable market theories are better predictors than the alternative 
models. If one is forced to choose between the perfectly-contested model and the over-contested 
model the choice will be the former. The average number of entrants per period is 2.56, which 
is closer to the one predicted by the perfectly contested model than the five predicted by the 
over-contested model. I 
The next five observations focus on aspects of strategic behavior and on system behavior. The 
first four of the observations are related to individual behavior and the strategies that individuals 
employ. The fifth observation is a summary property of the system as a whole. 
Observation 1 suggests that people bias their choices of prices in favor of those divisible by 
5 and that individual strategies exhibit a degree of modification to take advantage of the under- 
lying bias. For example, knowing about this bias, perhaps even in their own behavior, people 
sometimes reduce their own price by a unit. That is, rather than quote a price of 325 an indi- 
vidual might quote 324; or a 330 quotation would be modified downward to 329 rather than, say, 
increased to 331. 
OBSERVATION 1. Price choices are asymmetrically distributed downward around numbers that 
end in 0 or 5. 
Support. Actual prices ending in 0 or 5 accounted for a large percentage of choices (71 out 
of 146). Of the two, prices ending in 0 were the most common, occurring 50 times. Prices in a 
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Table V,A. Market A Profit by Experiment, Period, Individual 
Individl Experiment 061191 Experiment 062791 Experiment 071891 
Period 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 
1 - 305 660 - -- - -2700 325 300 - 290 - - - 316 - 213 300 
200 300 - - 267 
250 300 0 - - 267 
210 299 198 220 
215 300 196 - 290 
335 350 270 - - 
290 300 258 304 - 265 
320 300 298 300 - 290 
300 300 298 304 260 293 
300 310 - 305 - 300 
310 - - 325 100 283 
300 - - 302 260 300 
300 - 290 260 300 
300 300 - 300 300 300 
302 - - 308 298 350 
302 300 258 - 303 345 
301 300 - 303 301 300 
300 305 302 298 300 
301 300 301 306 320 
275 
296 
344 
311 
301 
309 
300 
265 
280 
301 
300 
300 
300 
305 
300 
0 
201 
870 
310 300 
400 
0 300 
300 310 
290 300 - 
297 275 297 
- 300- 
300 - 
- 300- 
300 301 - 
301 
- 300- 
300- 
- 300 300 
300 300 
294 260 290 
.- -. 369 - 
320 200 301 - 86 300 290 
350 300 
336 300 - 450 
309 293 444 300 
330 300 300 300 
299 290 298 300 
300 280 298 301 
300 280 300 300 
304 302 - 300 
303 325 300 300 
307 300 297-902 
304 281 300 298 
300 303 - 305 
302 302 301 298 
302 303 299 300 
295 300 288 303 
300 281 298 300 
317 
314 
147 300 - 308 
156 310 - 300 - 
212 298 - 303 
272 298 - 253 
- 302 231 
298 302 286 200 
298 298 210 
298 301 - 224 
298 300 296 306 
- 300 300 219 
296 298 300 220 
298 305 221 
- 302 - 186 
- 300  - 
- 303 - 226 
- 298 300 232 
250 
298 
249 
300 
299 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
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Table V,B. Market B Volume and Profit, by Individual, by Period 
Experiment 061191 
Indi- 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 
vidual 
Period Vol. Profit Vol. Profit Vol. Profit Vol. Profit Vol. Profit Vol. Profit Vol. Profit 
30 120 0 0 0 0 0 0 
31 -194 0 0 0 0 
0 0 30 180 
31 271 0 
31 209 0 
0 0 0 
8 0 0 
9 
28 2016 
8 -2936 0 0 
28 504 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 
0 
0 0 0 
0 0 
31 147 
31 178 
0 0 
32 480 
0 0 
31 333 
31 -612 
Experiment 062791 
Indi- Indl- 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 
vidual 
Period Vol. Profit Vol. Profit Vol. Profit Vol. Profit Vol. Profit Vol. Profit Vol. Profit 
26 1950 
26 2600 
1 -456 
31 2069 
0 0 
32 736 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
31 256 
26 2600 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 
0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
29 2023 
0 0 0 0 
30 900 
0 
0 0 0 31 364 
33 239 
0 0 
0 0 
0 33 388 
31 209 
31 364 
31 333 
31 364 
0 0 
30 330 
31 240 
0 0 
30 480 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
0 0 
31 -101 
31 240 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
22 -1166 
0 0 
31 457 
31 612 
0 0 
0 0 
31 364 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
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Table V,B. Continued 
Experiment 071891 
Indi- i- 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 
vidual 
Period Vol. Profit Vol. Profit Vol. Profit Vol. Profit Vol. Profit Vol. Profit Vol. Profit 
1 26 988 0 0 3 -1798 0 0 
2 3 -1048 0 0 0 0 0 0 27 263 
3 0 0 30 870 
4 28 112 0 0 0 0 
5 0 0 31 178 0 0 
6 31 23 0 0 
7 31 116 0 0 
8 0 0 0 0 31 85 
9 31 302 
10 31 302 0 0 
11 0 0 31 132 0 0 
12 31 178 
13 27 -952 0 0 
14 31 302 
15 0 0 31 395 0 0 
16 33 487 0 0 0 0 
17 0 0 19 185 0 0 
18 0 0 0 0 0 0 
19 0 0 31 178 
neighborhood, +1, around 0 and 5, were also asymmetrically distributed, with the two numbers 
9 and 4 being preferred to the two numbers 1 and 6 by a margin of 22 to 14. A hypothesis of 
equal probability can be rejected at .01 level of confidence. I 
The second observation suggests that behavior does not reflect the belief that the behavior 
of others is independently random with probabilities represented by the relative frequencies of 
choices. Table VII shows the relative frequencies with which price choices were made, together 
with the expected profit that would result from various pricing decisions, given that the choices 
of others are drawn with probabilities equal to the frequencies in the table. If the system was at a 
Nash equilibrium, then the expected profit would be the same for all price choices. 
OBSERVATION 2. Pricing strategies are not Nash responses given the relative frequency of 
prices that was observed. 
Support. Consider the potential ask prices in Table VII. The high prices in the neighborhood 
of 360 and 385 would yield a profit of 150 percent or greater of the lower prices. I 
The third observation is that scale choices of agents are optimal given actual volumes sold by 
sellers. This is particularly interesting because the scale choices are not optimal given the quanti- 
ties offered for sale by sellers. Recall that sellers entering market B chose a scale, a price, and a 
quantity offered. The observation is that the scale choice suggests that sellers (correctly) expected 
to sell the market demand quantity but they offered a little more than that expectation in hope that 
the volume would be (possibly accidentally) higher. 
OBSERVATION 3. The scale chosen by agents tends to be optimum given the actual quantity 
sold. Actual quantity sold tends to equal induced market demand given the quote of price. Quantity 
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Table VI. Frequency of Scale of Plant Choice in All Three Experiments, All Periods 
Number of Choices 
3 
0 
3 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
1 
9 
0 
1 
0 
3 
1 
0 
2 
8 
7 
25 
21 
41 
3 
15 
Courot triopoly and more 
Cournot duopoly 
Monopoly 
Contested market 
Table VII. Relative Frequency of Price Choices in Periods beyond the Sixth and Expected Profits of Price Strategy 
Relative Frequency of Posted Price Profit if Prob.* of Expected 
Price Range Low Price Choices Strategy Low Price Low Price Profit 
318 p < 324 19/90 0.21 
325 p c 329 22/90 0.24 325 302 0.79 238 
330 <p ? 334 10/90 0.11 330 457 0.54 256 
335 p < 339 5/90 0.07 335 612 0.43 257 
340 p c 344 4/90 0.04 340 630 0.39 220 
345 cp c 360 6/90 0.07 345 780 0.33 250 
360 p 24/90 0.27 360 1230 0.27 307 
385 1980 0.27 528 
*Computed neglecting ties. 
offered for sale is greater than actual sales and the scale of plant chosen is too small given the 
quoted quantity. 
Support. Figure 8 shows deviations of actual scale chosen from the theoretical optimum scale 
given the price quoted by the agent. If the seller has the lowest price then the demand function 
can be used to determine the quantity that will be sold. The quantity to be sold can be used 
to determine the optimal scale for that quantity. The figure shows deviations from this optimum 
where 0 indicates the optimum and + 1 indicates one letter deviations from the optimum. As can 
be seen in the figure, the mode of choice is the optimum given the price. 
Scale 
A 
B 
C 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
I 
J 
K 
L 
M 
N 
0 
P 
Q 
R 
S 
T 
U 
V 
w 
X 
Y 
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Frequency 
70 - 
1 
60- 
50- 
40- 
30- 
20- 
10 - 
-17 -16 -15 -14 -13 -12 -11 -10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 2 3 4 5 6 
Deviations from Optimum: Actual Scale Chosen Minus Optimal Scale (given Price Posted) 
Figure 8. Deviations from Optimum: Actual Scale Chosen Minus Optimal Scale (Given Price Posted) 
The same calculation can be made using the quantities offered for sale. Figure 9 shows de- 
viation of scale choice from the optimum given the quantity offered. As can be seen, the scale 
choices tend to be smaller than this calculation of optimum. I 
The next observation is that agents specialize in markets. Some agents are always in market 
A while others have a propensity to enter market B. Table VIII contains for each individual of 
each experiment, the total number of times during the nineteen periods of the experiment, the 
number of times the individual entered the B market. For example, the person with identification 
number 7 in experiment 061191 entered the B market 14 times out of the nineteen periods, while 
person 8 of that experiment never entered. 
OBSERVATION 4. The frequency with which market B is entered is not the same across sellers. 
Support. Test the hypothesis that the decisions made by the two individuals with the lowest 
propensity to enter, were independently drawn from the same distribution as the decisions of 
the two people with the highest propensity. The hypothesis is rejected at the .001 level of 
significance. I 
The final Observation 5 concerns the behavior of the whole market system. As was noted 
in Result 2, efficiencies are not at 100% as they should be if both the competitive model and 
the perfectly contested market were working perfectly to predict behavior. On average, excluding 
the first periods, the system of both markets is operating at an efficiency level of about 91.3%. 
While this is much better than the 80% predicted by the natural monopoly model, or the 41% 
predicted by the market collapse model, these two models suggest sources of inefficiency that can 
be interpreted as the social cost of regulation. If more than one firm happens to enter the market 
there is an opportunity cost of profits foregone in market A. On the other hand, if there is under 
entry (no firm enters and sells) an efficiency loss will exist due to the loss of consumer surplus 
in market B. The observation is that the efficiency loss from these two sources amounts to about 
67% of the 8.7% average loss in system efficiency (not including the first periods). 
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Frequency 
70- 
50 - 
40- 
30- 
20- 
10 - 
?0 -, , I I :n,: I:I,i, , , !, 
-17 -1, -5 -14 -13 -12 -11 -10 -9 -6 -7 -4 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Deviations from Optimum: Actual Scale Chosen Minus Optimal Scale (given Ouantity Offered) 
Figure 9. Deviations from Optimum: Actual Scale Chosen Minus Optimal Scale (Given Quantity Offered) 
Table VIII. Number of Decisions to Enter the B Market in All Nineteen Periods: By Individual, by Experiment 
Individual Identification Number 
Experiment 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
061191 14 0 4 11 7 10 2 
062791 18 1 12 1 14 2 2 
071891 6 3 8 0 11 2 18 
OBSERVATION 5. Excluding first periods, efficiency loss due to over entry is about 2.19% and 
efficiency loss due to under entry is about 3.32%. 
Support. If exactly one firm leaves market A and enters market B the system can operate 
at 100% efficiency. This maximum possible efficiency expressed as a function of the number of 
entrants, n is: maximum possible efficiency = 100 - (.01475)(n - 1) if n > 0. However, the 
maximum possible efficiency is .41 if n = 0. Thus, (.01475)(n - 1) is the efficiency loss due to 
over entry and .59 is the efficiency loss due to no entry (or under entry). Of course, both over 
entry and under entry can occur at the same time if several firms enter and all cancel their asks 
and thus sell nothing. 
The number of firms that left market A with an intent to enter market B each period of each 
experiment is contained in Table IV. Application of the formula to the numbers in the table pro- 
duces for all experiments and for all periods (except the first periods), an average loss of .0219 
due to over entry. The table also shows three periods, one in each experiment, in which no units 
were sold in market B due to no entry either by virtue of leaving market A and canceling (two 
periods) or by not leaving market A (one period). The efficiency loss averaged over all periods 
except the first periods, is 0.0332. I 
If the efficiency losses identified in Observation 5 are interpreted as the cost of market 
regulation then the overall average efficiency loss of 8.7% can be decomposed into an implicit 
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regulatory cost of 5.5% and "other inefficiencies" of 3.2%. Of course, whether or not this is 
the least expensive regulation possible is not addressed here. The major point is to identify the 
inefficiency and demonstrate that it can be measured. 
Once the "regulatory cost" or "uncoordinated entry cost" is removed, the remaining 3.2% 
efficiency loss is of interest. This percentage represents the combined effects of typos, wrong scale 
choices, inefficiencies due to strategic maneuvering, inefficiencies due to posted prices above 
average cost, etc. The fact that the combined effect of all sources of inefficiency is small, strongly 
suggests that, with the exception of uncoordinated entry, the perfectly contested market theory is 
predicting almost perfectly. That is, the cost expended on this form of regulation has been almost 
perfect in achieving its desired effect. 
V. Conclusions 
This paper posed a series of questions. First, will increasing returns result in a single seller? Will 
the single seller charge a monopoly price? If a monopoly price is not charged, do models exist 
that accurately predict what the price will be? 
The answer to the first question is "yes." For the most part, all sales tend to be made by 
a single agent. This is a particularly interesting result since neither monopolistically competitive 
or oligopolistic structures tended to evolve, even though they could have. In particular, the data 
provide no support at all for Cournot models of industrial structure and pricing. 
The answer to the second question is "no." Even though sales were almost always by a single 
seller, monopolistic pricing did not emerge. Instead, the single seller sold at prices near those that 
would prevail if units were supplied at the lowest average cost that covered the opportunity cost 
of the supplying firm. The supplying firm chose to operate at a scale of plant and at prices such 
that consumers paid the lowest possible price subject to the constraint that the supplier did not 
make a loss. Briefly put, the system behavior was closer to that described by contestable market 
theory than any of the other models considered. 
In some respects, the data here provide strong support for the conclusions drawn from other 
studies that experimentally examined the possibility of contestability theory. One could have been 
concerned that the results of other studies might have been due to subject boredom, the linearity 
of costs, the lack of latitude for monopolistically competitive organizations, etc. The results of 
this paper demonstrate that such concern about previous results are not well-founded. The funda- 
mental tendencies reported by others were observed after all of the potential explanations were 
controlled. 
To the extent that contestable market theory fell short of accurate predictions, the nature of 
the failure of contestability theory is interesting. The tendency to enter the "monopolized" market 
is too great and there is a chance that no one will enter. Firms tended to enter the industry in the 
hope that the incumbent would try to raise prices to near monopoly levels. Given the behavior 
of the incumbent, these firms would have been better off participating in alternative economic 
activity. In a sense, the policing activity was the cost of regulating the incumbent. Aside from 
this monitoring cost, the system worked substantially as predicted by contestability theory. 
Obviously there exist many alternative ways to conduct experiments and check the robust- 
ness of the results reported here. Existing theory, especially game theory, is rich with suggestions 
for further experiments, Shapiro [9, 330-414]. Theoretically, the timing of decisions could switch 
market behavior between Bertrand and Cournot. Theories of signaling, repeated games, and other 
This content downloaded from 131.215.23.238 on Mon, 3 Mar 2014 18:33:23 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
SCALE, NATURAL MONOPOLY, AND IMPERFECT COMPETITION 
facets of dynamic rivalry, suggest variables and circumstances that might have dramatic effects on 
behavior. The message, at this point, seems to be that future research and experimental designs 
to explore these many possibilities should proceed on the presumption that contestability theory 
will have considerable exploratory power. 
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